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Abstract 
Workers may experience unemployment spells of varying durations through their working 
lifecycles. This has strong implications for their income during those periods out of work and this 
is well known. Less known are the consequences of employment-breaks for the acquisition of 
pension rights and, consequently, for future initial pensions. Anecdotal evidence, however, is 
overwhelming that employment-breaks may be both seriously detrimental or very limited for 
workers’ future pension rights depending on the pension scheme and/or country where workers 
generate their retirement pensions. This paper provides simulations of the impact of 
employment-breaks on initial future pensions in Portugal and Spain. Given the differences and 
similarities of Social Security arrangements in both countries and worker and break types 
considered, we can show that some workers may suffer disproportionately from previous 
employment-breaks while others would hardly suffer any impact on their pensions. 
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1. Introduction
The political debate about the future of public 
pension systems in Portugal, Spain and in most 
OECD countries has traditionally been focused on its 
financial sustainability. Over the last 20 years several 
waves of pension reforms planned to ensure the long-
term financial sustainability of pension systems in the 
face of major demographic (population ageing) and 
economic changes (social and technological changes 
in labour markets) have brought and will continue to 
bring major changes in the living conditions for 
pensioners. Reforms also aspired to improve intra 
and intergenerational fairness, to promote stronger 
incentives to work and contribute and to ensure 
greater transparency. In countries as diverse as Italy, 
Sweden, Poland and Latvia pension reforms involved 
a complete transformation by moving to a Notional 
Defined Contribution (NDC) framework, in which 
benefits reflect the value of contributions made over a 
working life, even if the pension scheme continues to 
operate on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis. Other 
countries, such as Portugal and Spain, adopted major 
parametric changes in their public pension schemes 
that, while remaining PAYG and retaining the classic 
elements of a defined benefit design, switched to 
more (longevity and career-break) risk bearing 
pension benefits and, taken together, have had a 
substantial impact on future pension entitlements and 
scheme’s long term sustainability. 
Despite differences between countries, adopted 
pension reforms include common elements such as: 
(i) an extension of the minimum contributory years 
necessary to be eligible to pension entitlements, (ii) 
tightening the link between contributory years and 
pension benefits, (iii) changes in the pensionable 
earnings reference, (iv) changes in the annual 
indexation of pensions in payment, (v) modifications 
in the rules for valorisation of past earnings or 
contributions, (vi) changes in the way accrual rates 
are determined, (vii) raising the number of qualifying 
years for a full pension from last or best years to 
longer period or lifetime earnings, (viii) increasing the 
age limits to receive a full pension, in some cases in 
automatic manner, (ix) introducing demographic/ 
sustainability factors in pension benefit formulas, (x) 
tightening eligibility conditions, (xi) equalising pension 
ages of men and women, (xii) restricting access to 
early retirement, (xiii) introduction of automatic 
balancing mechanisms, (xiv) greater emphasis on pre-
funding and/or (xv) cuts to pensions in payment 
(European Commission, 2015). 
Although these reform measures may have 
contributed to address the fiscal sustainability 
problem, it is crucial to assess the effect of these 
reforms in terms of pension adequacy since social 
or political sustainability challenges will likely 
emerge in countries with a steep reduction in the 
generosity of pensions. According to the latest EU 
Commission projections (Ageing Report 2015), a 
substantial decline is projected in the public 
pension benefit ratio (to wages) for most of the 
Member States over the period 2013 to 2060, 
amounting to around -20 percentage points in the 
period in Spain and Portugal. More significantly, 
the projected expected decline in the gross 
replacement rate at retirement (which reflects the 
influence on benefit ratios of the newly awarded 
pensions) will be very significant in many OECD 
countries. For instance, between 2013 and 2060, 
the expected decline is 30.4% for Spain and 
26.7% for Portugal. If projections confirm, in 
2060 the gross replacement rate at retirement will 
be only 48.6% in Spain and 30.7% in Portugal.1 
Concerns over pension adequacy and foreseen 
old-age poverty in these countries are aggravated 
by the fact that the decline in the replacement rate 
for public pensions will not be offset by 
entitlements from 2nd and 3rd pillar schemes, 
unless significant pension reforms take place that 
shift pension accumulation from public first pillar 
schemes to second and third pillar schemes and/or 
people are encouraged to start saving privately for 
their retirement income. 
The retirement income and the standard of living of 
pensioners depend on a variety of critical factors. 
They include individual and familial life routes (e.g., 
age of employment entry, children, life expectancy, 
employment-breaks, inactivity, consumption and 
saving patterns), the size and composition of 
retirement wealth (e.g., housing and financial wealth), 
and the existence (and generosity) of minimum 
income provisions for older people (e.g., universal 
flat-rate pensions, contributory minimum pensions, 
social assistance programmes). Additional factors like 
the access to services and non-pension benefits (e.g., 
health care, long-term care, heating allowances), the 
size of derived pension rights, the significance of 
private pensions in the overall retirement pot or the 
magnitude of labour earnings after full retirement age 
 
                                                                
1 At the EU aggregated level, the public pension replacement ratio would 
reach around 35% by 2060 (against close to 48% in 2013). 
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(where and when compatible with pension benefits) 
are also relevant in assessing the sufficiency of 
retirement income. 
Pension systems have a central role in (almost 
entirely) replacing labour income after retirement, in 
securing adequate living standards in old age and in 
protecting people from poverty. In Bismarckian 
pension schemes, in which benefits are more or less 
closely linked to contributions, following a 
compulsory professional insurance principle, 
individual employment histories determine the level 
of pensions workers receive when they reach 
retirement age. Everything else constant, the higher a 
worker’s individual pensionable earnings and the 
more continuous his career, the higher the pension 
benefits will be. This means that voluntary or 
involuntary career breaks due to, for example, 
unemployment, part-time employment, termination 
of fixed-term contracts, parental leave, childbearing, 
childrearing, illness/disability, studying, military 
service, housekeeping without raising children or 
general inactivity periods can affect the accrual of 
pension benefits and therefore be detrimental to 
pension benefit levels, and, in some cases, to 
incentives to work longer. Pension credits and 
pension accrual for periods out of labour market, 
derived pension rights (e.g., survivor's pensions) and 
other redistributive mechanisms in pension systems 
have the potential to partially offset the contribution 
gaps related to career breaks. 
Career breaks are irrelevant in non-contributory 
schemes, and are implicitly ruled out in some pension 
plan designs.2 With some typified exceptions (e.g., 
Sweden, Denmark, France), pension credits are rarely 
found in privately run personal or occupational 
pension schemes. Similarly, in voluntary private 
pension schemes, savers are entitled to pension 
credits only to the extent they have bought extra 
accrual periods by paying additional voluntary 
contributions into the system. 
Most (public) earnings related pension systems of 
OECD countries grant pension rights through pension 
credits and pension accruals for periods spent outside 
the labour market for reasons that are considered 
commendable (maternity/paternity, care duties, 
military service, education, incapacity for work, or 
 
                                                                
2 For instance, in Portugal, for the reference earnings calculation purpose, 
whenever the number of calendar years with earnings registration is higher 
than 40, it will consider the best 40 annual adjusted earnings, which means 
any years out of work more than that duration do not affect public 
retirement income. Whereas in Spain, employment breaks where the 
obligation to contribute to the public pension scheme does not exist are 
integrated in the contribution record attributing the minimum pensionable 
wage at any time to the closest (to retirement age) 48 months and half this 
pensionable wage to the rest of the employment-break months. 
unemployment). In some cases, the accrual of 
pension rights is made through contributions 
deducted from benefits received during career breaks 
or through the purchase of pension rights by means 
of voluntary contributions. Pension credits may be 
granted in the form of assumed career years (e.g., 
Portugal, Spain), pension points (e.g., France, 
Germany) or social security contributions credited to 
the individual (e.g., Sweden) or a combination of 
them (EU, 2015). To mitigate the effects of career 
breaks some countries have chosen to ease the rules 
on how past contributions on low income are 
accounted for in the pension benefit formula. For 
instance, in Canada, past earnings are ranked in 
descending order and the years with lowest earnings 
are excluded from the pension benefit calculation. 
The effectiveness of pension credits in counteracting 
employment breaks depends on the duration of 
leave, the pensionable earnings base (e.g., earnings 
immediately prior to break, reference earnings, 
unemployment or childcare-related benefits, 
minimum wage), and the ways in which those 
parameters count towards pension entitlements (e.g., 
best years of earnings versus full career in benefit 
calculation formulae, specific redistributive features of 
pension schemes). In many cases, pension credits 
are linked to the receipt of unemployment or 
childcare benefits and are, thus, subject to time limits 
and/or other conditionality conditions such as 
participation in training and activation programs. 
Although pension credits and pension accrual during 
periods out of labour market are important, in 
earnings-related schemes they tend not to be 
sufficient to fully offset the impact of career breaks on 
pension benefits. Social security contributions 
credited to the individual tend to be at a low level 
when compared to labour income (as minimum 
pensionable wages are often used by default), 
resulting in smaller pension accruals during periods 
out of work. 
Despite its relevance, little research has been done to 
estimate the impact of career breaks on pension 
benefits and on the probability of not complying with 
pension schemes eligibility conditions, particularly the 
minimum years of service required to qualify for a 
(full or partial) pension at ordinary retirement ages. In 
this paper, we aim to close this gap and estimate the 
impact of employment-breaks on pension benefits 
using a simulation approach based on actual pension 
rules, taking into consideration the timing and 
duration of non-employment spells, the existence of 
pension credit mechanisms to compensate the 
contribution gap, different lifecycle labour earnings 
profiles and the motive for the employment break. 
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Several layers of earnings profiles are considered to 
assess whether the redistributive features of pension 
schemes amplify or minimize the impact of 
contribution gaps on pension entitlements. In 
addition, to assess the effect of post-interruption 
wages on pension entitlements and the significance 
of restoration effects, we considered alternative 
(convergent, divergent) earnings profiles. The 
financial, economic and social implications of career 
breaks are discussed together with their policy 
implications. Detailed numerical results are presented 
using the current Portuguese public pension scheme 
benefit rules as an example, together with a simpler 
illustrative case for the Spanish public pension 
scheme. We analyse to what extent are the build-up 
of pension entitlements in contributory systems 
protected in the case of career breaks by simulating 
the effects on final pension benefits and pension 
wealth of sample cases with career breaks due to 
childcare, unemployment or inactivity. 
The magnitude of the impact of shorter and more 
fragmented careers on pension entitlements is 
expected to depend on the type, timing and duration 
of non-employment spells, mainly because the on-the-
job accumulation of human capital varies over the 
employment career and human capital accumulated 
on the job is one of the main determinants of an 
individual’s wage rate. In fact, it is well known that the 
accumulation of human capital may be interrupted 
and the stock of human capital may be deteriorated 
because of discontinuities in the employment pattern, 
because of technical and organizational progress or 
since the employee’s knowledge is not maintained 
and updated during absence. However, if the career 
interruption is due to training periods, positive wage 
effects are expected, i.e., the overall wage changes 
may be split into two components, a missing 
experience effect and an additional productivity 
related effect. 
Additionally, the size of losses in pension benefits 
depends on the existence (and the design) of social 
security policies that mitigate earnings losses either 
by compensating directly for career interruptions or 
minimizing the reduction in the accumulation of 
human capital. If, on one hand, the adequacy of 
protection of pension entitlements during career 
breaks is important, on the other hand the protection 
must be balanced with the financial incentives for 
individuals to return to the labour market. 
In recent years, there has been a trend away from 
the conventional employment relationships covered 
by social security systems towards more flexible work 
patterns, typically only partially (or not) covered, such 
as temporary employment, part-time jobs, self-
employment, teleworking, and nomadic working. An 
increase in non-employment spells augments the 
turnover of workers between contributing and not 
contributing, and this is likely to have an impact on 
the access to contributory pensions since the 
fulfilment of the vesting period conditions is more 
difficult and social security administrations are 
increasing their capacity to monitor contribution 
careers. Even in countries with high coverage levels, 
there might be a considerable number of workers 
who would not ultimately be well protected by 
contributory systems despite of being registered as 
contributors in the case of having had mostly 
temporary and/or part-time work arrangements 
through their working lives. 
Family-related non-employment periods (for 
childbirth, child-raising or care-giving responsibilities) 
play a major part in women’s employment 
biographies. The literature dealing with this subject 
highlights the specific situation of women (see, e.g., 
Arun et al. (2004) and Malo and Munoz-Bullon, 
2008). Women that have children and give up their 
job lose their own income, and if they decide to re-
join the labour force they frequently find themselves 
accepting lower wages and facing poor career 
development opportunities. Ultimately, they also face 
lower pension benefits. Pension crediting of these 
periods is therefore crucial in terms of the pension 
adequacy of women. Although they are not usually 
sufficient to fully offset the contribution gaps related 
to delayed, shorter or interrupted careers, they can 
contribute to mitigate the negative effects on pension 
benefits.3 
Careers interrupted at different ages have different 
consequences in terms of pension benefits. Non-
employment periods due to child-raising tend to have 
greater impact than care-giving periods, not only 
because of their longer duration, but also due to their 
early onset which more critically impacts on women’s 
future working trajectories biographies. Additionally, 
empirical evidence suggests that the impact on 
pension benefits of discontinuous employment 
careers tend to be very different, in sign and in size, 
for women and men (Beblo and Wolf, 2002). While 
wage cuts for women are mainly triggered by 
parental leave and additional home time, men’s 
wages seem to be negatively affected by 
unemployment and inactivity periods. Other reasons 
for earning losses that depend on the type of career 
 
                                                                
3 Spain has recently passed legislation that grants mothers eligible for old-
age pensions up to a 15% increase in their pension accruals if they have 
three or more children. 
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interruption are potential stigma or signalling effects. 
Several studies suggest that past unemployment 
spells may raise negative expectations on the side of 
the employer regarding the actual productivity or 
motivation of the potential employee, translating into 
lower wages (see, e.g., Albrecht et al., 1999). 
The structure of the remaining of this paper is as 
follows: Section 2 discusses the theory and empirical 
evidence about the effects of employment-breaks on 
retirees’ incomes. As it turns out of this discussion, 
employment-breaks should and indeed influence 
retirement incomes. Section 3 contains a detailed 
simulation, for the Portuguese case, of the effects of 
employment-breaks in typical cases for workers at, 
above or below average earnings. This simulation, 
made considering the actual Portuguese retirement 
and pension rules, shows that breaks occurring early 
in working life have a negligible effect on future 
pensions (as compared to a baseline) if earnings 
profiles are recovered after the break. On the other 
extreme, breaks occurring at preretirement ages have 
more serious incidence on pensions. Section 4 is 
devoted to a much simpler illustration of the effects of 
employment-breaks in retirement incomes of typical 
workers in Spain, given existing rules. Again, simple 
as they are, significant effects may happen when 
breaks occur in the working life and whether breaks 
are due to covered unemployment or not. A final 
Section 5 summarizes major points and findings of 
this research. A series of Annexes containing details 
of the simulations for Portugal are also included. 
. 
.  
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2. The influence of employment-breaks on 
pension benefits: Theory and empirical evidence 
The differences in pension benefits depend on a variety 
of individual and familial life routes and can be 
determined by several factors. In pension schemes in 
which contributions are closely linked to benefits, the 
higher a worker’s individual earnings and the more 
continuous is the contribution career, the higher the 
pension benefits will be. In other words, employment 
breaks like unemployment or parental leave shorten 
working lives and typically reduce lifetime earnings and 
contribution losses, thus reducing pension benefits in 
the future.4 
These losses in pension benefits can be expected to 
depend on a number of factors such as when the 
employment-break occurs, on the duration of 
employment-breaks, on the wage effects of employment 
breaks and/or part-time periods, on the earnings profile 
of the individual, on the way pension rights accrue in 
the pension scheme (e.g., the benefit formula in DB 
schemes), or on the existence and significance of 
pension credits to plug the contribution gap (periods 
covered and pensionable earnings base). The specific 
rules regarding which earnings are considered in 
calculating pension benefits, the eligibility criteria for 
basic and minimum old-age pensions, the existence and 
significance of basic and minimum pension levels and 
the redistributive features of the pension scheme are 
also important in determining the size of the losses. 
As a rule, the further back in time these breaks occur, 
the smaller their incidence on retirement incomes, and 
vice versa. Breaks occurring at mid working age or close 
to retirement time have a larger incidence due to the 
heavier weight these contribution periods have in 
standard pension formulae. Also, pension formulae 
including a significant component based on “X” best or 
last contribution years tend to protect pension 
entitlements from employment-breaks occurring outside 
the pension calculation reference period. 
Human capital accumulated on the job is considered 
one of the main determinants of an individual’s wage 
rate. Discontinuities in the employment profile are 
expected to cause wage cuts since they imply an 
interruption in the accumulation of human capital as well 
as a depreciation of the human capital stock built up in 
the past (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). This is because 
 
                                                                
4 Many countries have arrangements by which contributions to social security of 
unemployed workers covered by unemployment insurance/assistance schemes 
are paid on their behalf by the programmes up to the previous earnings levels, 
often. In these cases, workers will not suffer any impact on their retirement 
incomes for the covered unemployment spells.  
technical progress and innovations in the work process 
may cause human capital acquired in previous years of 
employment to become obsolete after an employment-
break, particularly if this know-how is not preserved and 
updated during the career break. On the job, workers 
often acquire firm-specific skills that are not necessarily 
transferable to other companies. Consequently, a new 
position where these skills are not valued will likely pay a 
lower wage, at least initially, until the worker acquires 
the skills that are valued by the new employer. 
Additionally, the longer a worker is out of work, the 
more his or her firm-specific skills depreciates, making 
the worker less valuable to a new employer. This 
situation again translates into receiving a lower initial 
wage at a new job. 
According to the human capital theory, the higher is the 
concentration of human capital investment in early ages 
the higher will be lifetime earnings and the lower will be 
both the risk and the duration of unemployment spells 
(Becker, 1975, 1985; Mincer, 1974; D’Addio, 1998, 
2000). The duration of unemployment is determined by 
individuals’ search effort and job acceptance decisions, 
the random arrivals of job offers as well as the 
generosity of unemployment benefit and assistance 
programmes. An individual who is unemployed longer is 
expected to face different labour demand (aka receive 
less and potentially different job offers) the longer the 
duration of unemployment, because of skill depreciation 
or stigma (Machin and Manning, 1999). In addition, 
workers may accept different jobs and lower wages the 
longer they are unemployed, i.e., they may have a 
declining reservation wage the longer they have been 
out of work.  
Cooper (2014) investigated the relationship between 
unemployment duration and workers’ future earnings 
using data from the United States by comparing the 
earnings trajectories over time of displaced and non-
displaced workers as well as differences in earnings 
paths for workers that experience short-duration versus 
long-duration unemployment. The author concludes that 
there is a negative relationship between a worker’s most 
recent unemployment spell and his or her current 
earnings, that the earnings of displaced workers do not 
catch up to those of their non-displaced counterparts for 
nearly 20 years and that the effect of unemployment on 
earnings is more significant the longer the duration of 
unemployment. Schmieder et al. (2014) estimate the 
causal effect of unemployment duration on re-
employment wage offers using social security data in 
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Germany from 1975 to 2008 and conclude that the 
negative impact of unemployment duration on wages is 
of 0.8% per month. 
Some authors find a catch-up effect (also called 
“restoration effect”) of human capital following an 
unemployment-break (particularly between formerly 
part-time employees who take up a full-time position 
again) that may partly offset the depreciation of human 
capital and mitigate re-employment wage cuts (Galler, 
1991; Licht and Steiner, 1992). Workers can recover 
earnings and subsequently pension losses resulting from 
career breaks if they can prolong their working lives 
afterwards. The restoration effect might be stronger in 
the early and middle compared to the late employment 
period as predicted by human capital theory. 
The timing of employment breaks on the individual 
income profile matters because skills, knowledge and 
experience change over time and they are valued 
differently on the labour market. If there is a 
depreciation of accumulated human capital during 
employment breaks and part-time periods, the timing of 
these events becomes a crucial determinant of the 
resulting wage effects. These effects directly concern 
pension benefits because they interact with earnings 
and thereby individual qualifications during the 
employment period. Potrafke (2007) and Potrafke and 
Steiner (2007) examined how the timing of employment 
breaks affects pension benefits in Germany and 
concluded that the losses due to career interruptions in 
the early and middle employment periods differ.5 
However, the negative effects due to unemployment in 
the late employment period were found weak. Similar 
results were obtained by Beblo and Wolf (2002) that 
concluded that while the three-year break right at the 
beginning of the employment career may have minor 
impact on re-employment wages, postponing the 
interruption by ten years raises the re-employment wage 
penalty significantly. Arulampalam et al. (2001) claim, 
for the contrary, that unemployment early in a worker’s 
career might endanger young workers’ future labour 
market possibilities. 
El Mekkaoui et al. (2011) evaluated the impact of 
different employment-breaks on pension benefits for 
French private sector workers and concluded that by 
compensating for some career accidents, the French 
legislation allows individuals to receive, in some cases, 
the same level of social security pension that they would 
have received with a smooth professional path. In an 
assessment of the impact of shorter and more 
 
                                                                
5 The results showed that, regarding men, unemployment in the middle 
employment period reduced pension benefits more severely than when 
occurred in the early employment period. Unemployment was not that 
important regarding women. 
fragmented careers on mandatory public and private 
pension entitlements in OECD countries, considering 
pension credits, OECD (2015) concludes that pension 
credits in earnings-related pension systems mitigate the 
effects on pension benefits of workers with interrupted 
work histories, but are not sufficient to fully offset their 
contribution shortfalls. The investigation assumes, 
however, that pension entitlements are forward-looking 
in the sense that pension rules of the base year (2014) 
will apply throughout the career until workers reach the 
standard pension age in their country.  
The literature dealing with this subject highlights the 
specific situation of women (see, e.g., D’Addio, 2012, 
2015 and references therein). Employment-breaks due 
to child-raising have greater policy relevance than care-
giving periods, not only because of their longer 
duration, but also due to their early onset which more 
critically impacts on women’s future labour market 
biographies and pension entitlements. As the number of 
children rises, so does the overall duration of 
employment breaks. Empirical studies show that apart 
from the number of children, the level of qualification 
also influences the duration of family-related 
employment breaks. The higher the vocational 
qualification, the shorter the career breaks. Child-related 
employment breaks tend to be ‘game-changing’ 
biographical events. While most women worked (full-
time) right up to their first child-raising period, the 
situation afterwards is more heterogeneous and 
uncertain. Employment continuity at near full-time level 
strengthens women’s own pension entitlements, which 
combined with derived pension rights is likely to secure 
adequate income in retirement. The longer the ‘non-
active’ periods due to care-giving the lower will be the 
personal pension rights of women. The increase in 
minimum contributory years put forward by recent 
pension reform could exclude from benefit claim people 
with interrupted employment careers and shorter 
insurance periods, among whom women are 
overrepresented, as they are more likely to hold part-
time jobs and take career breaks due to family 
responsibilities. 
The tightening of the relationship between contributions 
accumulated and pension benefits and the fact that 
pension benefits will increasingly depend upon the 
workers’ entire career is likely to have different gender 
effects, depending on gender differences in earnings 
profiles and employment patterns. As for the benefit 
weighting formula, since women exhibit more irregular 
and interrupted career patterns, they may suffer greater 
reductions in benefits when lifelong earnings are 
considered. For the contrary, since men’s earnings 
typically exhibit higher dynamism in the late career and 
the gender gap tends to be wider in old age, recent 
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pension reforms are likely to proportionally penalise men 
more than women, who on average have less steep 
careers. 
In earnings-related pension schemes, whether DB or DC, 
the accumulation of pension entitlements is usually 
linked to an individual's contributory record when 
working, if vesting periods have been completed. 
Nevertheless, pension entitlements can also be granted 
for periods out of the labour market when people have 
responsibilities (e.g., childbirth, child-rearing), or are 
undertaking invaluable social activities (e.g., military 
service) which are rewarded by the scheme, or simply 
to achieve gender equity. Accrual of pension 
entitlements for periods out of the labour market 
available in OECD countries takes three main forms: 
pension credits, contributions deducted from 
(unemployment, sickness) benefits received during 
career breaks or the purchase of pension rights through 
voluntary contributions (see Table 1). 
Depending on the eligibility and entitlement conditions 
in the respective pension system, credits may be 
granted in the form of assumed career years, pension 
points, social security contributions credited to the 
individual or a combination of them (EU, 2015). Social 
security contributions credited to the individual tend to 
be at a low level when compared to labour income - 
equivalent to the minimum wage or a fraction of the last 
individual or average wage, resulting in smaller pension 
accruals during periods out of work. Where pensions are 
universal (based, for example, on residency), credits for 
periods outside the labour market are implicit 
(automatically covered) in the system. 
 
 
Table 1. Explicit credits in earnings-related pension systems for unemployment and childcare 
 
Note: The abbreviations denote: x = Explicit pension credits exist in the earnings-related pension system; .. = Not available; ..* = Not available in the 
earnings-related pension scheme; Implicit refers to mechanisms not explicitly designed to cover periods of interruptions but that implicitly exert that same 
function either thanks to pension rules or first-tier components; pt = Credit only exists for part-time workers. 
Source: OECD (2015) with author's additions. 
 
In Portugal and Spain, workers acquire pension rights for 
some types of career interruptions (unemployment, 
maternity/paternity illness or disability periods). In most 
cases, this protection is linked to receipt of an 
unemployment benefit and is thus subject to time limits 
and/or other conditionality conditions such as 
participation in training and activation programs. In 
addition, the amount of pension is often calculated from 
a smaller reference wage, resulting in lower future 
pension entitlements. For instance, in Spain the 
entitlement to pension credits during unemployment is 
linked to the family situation of the unemployed. 
Inactivity could be also compensated by allowing 
insurance periods but only in the case of children's 
education. 
 
Explicit Implicit Explicit Implicit Explicit Implicit Explicit Implicit
Australia .. x .. x Israel .. ..
Austria x x Italy x x
Belgium x x Japan x x
Canada x x Korea x .. x
Switzerland x x x x Luxembourg x x
Chile x .. Mexico .. x .. x
Czech Republic x x Netherlands .. x .. x
Germany x x Norway x x
Denmark x x New Zealand .. x .. x
Estonia x .. x Poland x x
Spain x x Portugal ft/pt x
Finland x x Slovak Republic x x
France x x Slovenia pt x
Greece x x Sweden x x
Hungary x x Turkey x ..
Ireland x .. x United Kingdom x .. x
Iceland .. x x United States .. x .. x
Childcare Unemployment Childcare Unemployment
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3. Impact of career breaks on pensions: A detailed 
illustration for Portugal 
3.1 Methodological approach 
In this section, we investigate the impact of 
employment-breaks on old-age pension entitlements of 
private sector workers using the Portuguese Social 
Security System current rules as an illustrative 
benchmark. The main goal is to assess how different is 
the pension entitlement of a worker who has a history of 
(single, multiple, short or long duration) career breaks 
from that of a baseline retiree who has worked a full, 
uninterrupted career, taking into the consideration the 
existence of pension credit mechanisms to compensate 
the contribution gap, the timing of employment breaks, 
the motive for the employment break, alternative 
earnings profiles and the overall effect of retirement 
income taxation regimes. First, we present the typical 
cases considered in the simulation study together with 
the assumptions. Then, we will present the pension 
entitlements for working life courses that are not 
affected by employment breaks, allowing us then to 
analyse the impact of different types of career breaks on 
initial benefits, replacement rates and pension wealth. 
To assess the impact of career breaks on pension 
entitlements we use the “typical cases” method and define 
sample cases of a private sector worker's career path 
which deviates from a full-time continuous career because 
of unemployment or childcare breaks. Sample or typical 
cases are often used for the assessment of public policies. 
Since our goal is to provide an accurate description of real 
pension schemes, sample cases were chosen to 
represent as closely as possible the most frequent 
individual career breaks. Survey (SHARE survey) and 
administrative data were used to capture the key pattern 
of employment breaks in Portugal and Spain and to assist 
in the design of typical employment breaks. 
In our study, the baseline full-career case refers to a 27-
year-old childless individual born on January first 1948, 
entering the labour market on January first 1975 and 
retiring on January first, 2015 at the current statutory 
retirement age of 66 after completing a 40-year 
continuous contributions career without breaks or reduced 
activity periods, having received during his whole career 
the observed minimum wage. The computed pension 
entitlements are based on parameters and rules set out by 
Portuguese Social Security System governed by legislation 
in force, as detailed in Appendix A. 
Pension credits for unemployment and childcare career 
interruptions were explicitly taken into consideration in the 
calculation of pension entitlements (see Appendices B and 
C for details). As in most OECD countries, Portugal offers 
protection of pension accruals in the public pension 
schemes in the event of unemployment, layoff, 
maternity, paternity and parenthood, temporary 
incapacity for work, sickness, partial or absolute 
temporary incapacity for work due to occupational 
disease or work accident, military service (or civilian 
service where applicable) and jury service fulfilment 
through the attribution of pension credits. The coverage 
of pension credits is linked to the receipt of an 
unemployment, childcare or sickness benefit and is, thus, 
subject to time limits and/or other conditionality 
conditions such as participation in training and activation, 
and on not having received all benefits as a lump sum 
payment. For instance, unemployment benefits are 
granted only to those involuntarily unemployed that are 
not working, registered as job seeker with the job centre, 
fully capable of working, available and actively looking for 
work, are not in receipt of an invalidity or old-age pension 
and reside in Portugal.6 Moreover, the pensionable 
earnings base of pension credits is determined by the 
existing rules for the calculation of unemployment and 
childcare benefits. In Portugal, the entitlement to pension 
credits during unemployment is not linked to the family 
financial situation of the unemployed. In considering the 
impact of pension credits on pension entitlements we 
adopt a backward-looking approach and assume that 
existing rules and parameters of the year 2015 were 
applied throughout the career until workers reach the 
statutory retirement age. 
We conducted a systematic analysis on the effect of 
unemployment spells on pension entitlements and 
simulated the influence of: (i) single or multiple breaks; 
(ii) short and long duration breaks; (iii) Employment 
breaks occurring at the beginning, at the middle and at 
the end of the contribution career; (iv) Breaks for low, 
average and high earners; (v) Breaks for flat and 
ascending earnings profiles; (vi) post-interruption 
convergent and divergent earnings profiles. 
 
                                                                
6 There are special rules applying to people in long-term unemployment. People 
aged 57 or over who are long-term unemployed can retire at age 62 with full 
pension without decrement. It is required that the minimum contribution conditions 
are met and unemployment-benefit entitlement is exhausted. Early retirement is 
also possible from age 57 with at least 22 years contributions for individuals who 
become unemployed at age 52 or more. In these cases, the pension is reduced 
with a 0.5% monthly decrement, with a maximum of 5 years reduction applied. 
Whenever unemployment is due to an agreed work contract cessation, the pension 
amount will be subject to an additional reduction rate that will last until the 
pensioner is 65 years old. Means-tested unemployment assistance subsidy is 
provided if registered contribution is more than 180 days in the 12 months prior to 
unemployment and monthly earnings before unemployment is less than 80% of 
the minimum wage. This allowance can be extended until beneficiaries meet the 
conditions for early retirement if they are 50 years of age. 
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In assessing the influence of the timing employment 
breaks on pension benefits, three different career 
phases (early, middle and late) are distinguished. We 
considered the possibility of single breaks at the 
beginning (between ages 30 and 35), at the middle 
(between ages 40 and 45) and late in contribution 
career (between ages 62 and 66), together with 
combined multiple breaks. In distinguishing between 
single short and long duration employment breaks, we 
specify five durations for the unemployment and 
childcare spells, from one to five consecutive years. 
Seven layers of earnings profiles are considered to 
assess the redistributive features of the pension scheme: 
– A “low earnings” flat profile earning the observed 
national nominal minimum wage (MW) throughout 
the entire contribution career. The annual MW in 
Portugal amounted to 7070 EUR in 2015; 
– A “low to middle earnings” profile earning 75% of the 
observed national annual nominal average wage (AW) 
in Portugal throughout the entire contribution career. 
– An average wage worker profile earning the AW 
throughout the entire contribution career. The 
annual AW in Portugal amounted to 12795 EUR in 
2015; 
– Two “middle to high earnings” workers earning 1.5 
times or 2 times the AW; 
– Three “high earnings” workers earning 2, 3 or 6 
times the AW. 
Additionally, for all of the above earnings profiles, an 
ascending wage profile has been simulated assuming 
the worker starts with the minimum or one of the six 
multiples of the average wage and experiences an 
annual salary raise of 2% above the reference earning 
profiles. To simplify, we assume in this case that the 
earnings progress is linear and not concave as it is 
generally observed. In Figure 1 we represent the six 
layers of annual earnings profiles considered in this 
study over the period 1975-2014. 
Figure 1: Annual Earnings Profiles in Portugal, 1975-2014 
 
Source: Author's preparation based on Statistics Portugal data. 
 
To assess the effect of post-interruption wages on 
pension entitlements and the significance of restoration 
effects, we considered three alternative profiles: 
– a baseline scenario in which we assume that after an 
employment break the earnings path resume to that 
of a worker who has not suffered a career break 
(Figure 2); 
– a “divergent earnings” profile in which we assume 
that after an employment break earnings are 
reduced by 10% per year of job displacement when 
compared to those of a worker who has not suffered 
a career break (Figure 3); 
– a “convergent earnings” profile in which we assume 
that after an employment break earnings are 
reduced by 10% per year of job displacement when 
compared to those of a worker who has not suffered 
a career break but then catch-up with the baseline 
scenario in five years; 
Figure 2: Baseline earnings profiles with 2 years 
unemployment breaks during career 
 
Source: Author's preparation. 
 
To isolate the empirical results from penalties or 
bonuses due to early or late retirement, respectively, we 
assume individuals retire at the statutory retirement age 
so that pension entitlements are computed at the full 
accrual rate. Other studies frequently combine early or 
late retirement with compensated and uncompensated 
unemployment or inactivity spells, a methodological 
option that does not allow discerning the specific effect 
of pension entitlements for periods out of the labour 
market, even if breaks and expected pensions losses 
could induce a change in labour supply behaviour. The 
rate of payroll contributions is assumed constant in the 
calculations, as observed in the Portuguese pension 
system. In the calculation of initial pension benefits, the 
revalorization of past wages is done using the current 
index as defined by law (consumer price index excluding 
housing prices).7 
 
 
                                                                
7 Portaria n.º 266/2014 de 17 de Dezembro. 
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Figure 3: Divergent earnings profiles with 2 years 
unemployment breaks during career 
 
Source: Author's preparation. 
 
 
3.2 Results and analysis 
The preferred indicator used to study the impact of 
employment breaks on pension entitlements is the 
ratio between the gross pension benefit of a worker 
who has interrupted his career for some time and that 
of a worker who has contributed uninterruptedly from 
the age of entry into the labour market to normal 
statutory pension age. The benchmark is a full-career 
entitlement. Instead of using the relative gross pension 
entitlements of interrupted versus full-career profiles, 
we could have used deviations in replacement rates (El 
Mekkaoui et al., 2011). 
The replacement rate is, however, a partial indicator 
since it only assesses how well older people can 
maintain their pre-retirement levels of consumption 
once they stop working, i.e., concentrates on how 
benefits compare with previous income (in a narrow 
sense because income other than wages and pensions 
is not considered). Although replacement rates are 
consistent with lifetime consumption smoothing, i.e., 
the notion that pensions should replace a reasonable 
fraction of pre-retirement income, this direct measure 
of adequacy has its limitations. First, they do not 
consider the contributory effort made by employees 
(and employers) and/or differential life expectancy, i.e., 
intra-generational fairness and equity considerations 
between individuals are ignored. Second, it is a 
historical measure since one needs to wait until 
retirement to be able to assess replacement rates. 
Third, it is not a prospective measure since it does not 
give information on the impact of future changes in 
pension system rules. Fourth, it is an individual 
measure and thus may not be representative of the 
whole population. Fifth, replacement rates have no 
direct link with poverty in the sense that a pension 
system may replace 100% of previous income and yet 
not be enough to reduce the risk-of-poverty. Sixth, the 
replacement rate may not be representative for the 
analysis, for instance in those cases where the 
individual goes through a non-employment period just 
before retirement. Finally, replacement rates are a 
single point-in-time indicator, they do not take 
longevity into account and how it affects lifetime 
transfers to the individual. 
In Tables 2, 3 and 4 we represent the impact of single 
unemployment spells of different duration occurring, 
respectively, at the beginning, middle or end of the 
contribution career on the relative gross pension 
entitlements of a representative worker who has a 
history of career breaks and might have been granted 
pension credits, compared to that of a baseline retiree 
who has worked a full, uninterrupted career. 
Unemployment spells are here defined as 
uninterrupted years in which an individual was 
unemployed. Panels A and B represent the relative 
gross pension entitlements for the scenarios in which 
we assume post-interruption earnings resume to that of 
a worker who has not suffered a career break, for both 
the baseline and ascending wage profiles, respectively. 
Panels C and D represent the relative gross pension 
entitlements for the scenarios in which we assume 
post-interruption divergent wage paths, for both the 
baseline and ascending wage profiles, respectively. In 
every Table and Panel, column 2 exhibits the initial 
pension benefit for the seven alternative earnings 
profiles, column 3 shows the full-career relative gross 
pension entitlements index and columns 4 to 8 
represent the relative gross pension entitlements for 
interrupted careers of different duration (one to five-
years). 
The impact of single unemployment spells of different 
duration occurring early in the contribution career on 
the gross pension entitlements of low-, average-, and 
high-earning workers is not very significant if we 
assume that when the unemployed worker finds a job 
again, relative pay is the same as in their old position. 
The gross pension of a worker who earns the baseline 
average wage throughout life and interrupts his career 
for one to five years would drop by an amount ranging 
between 0.22% and 1.51% relative to a worker who 
has not interrupted his career (Table 2, Panel A). For 
the same representative average wage worker but with 
an ascending wage profile, the gap decreases by an 
amount ranging between 0.13% and 0.89% for one to 
five-year unemployment breaks (Table 2, Panel B). The 
pension drops slightly less for minimum wage workers 
and is increases marginally for medium to high-income 
levels. 
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Table 2. Initial gross pension benefits and relative gross pension entitlements for single unemployment spells occurring at the 
beginning of the contribution career 
 
Panel A: No post-interruption wage penalty; Baseline earnings profile 
Earnings 
profiles 
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 383.72 100 99.77 99.37 98.90 98.78 98.78 
0.75 AW 548.75 100 99.83 99.59 99.30 98.95 98.59 
AW 731.03 100 99.78 99.52 99.21 98.85 98.49 
1.5 AW 1,094.26 100 99.77 99.49 99.18 98.83 98.47 
2 AW 1,457.28 100 99.77 99.49 99.18 98.83 98.47 
3 AW 2,177.90 100 99.76 99.46 99.14 98.80 98.44 
6 AW 4,326.35 100 99.68 99.36 99.03 98.68 98.34 
 
 
Panel B: No post-interruption wage penalty; Ascending wage profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 724.45 100 99.87 99.64 99.37 99.07 98.81 
0.75 AW 1,040.82 100 99.91 99.77 99.60 99.40 99.18 
AW 1,386.02 100 99.87 99.72 99.54 99.33 99.11 
1.5 AW 2,075.25 100 99.87 99.72 99.55 99.35 99.14 
2 AW 2,760.79 100 99.87 99.72 99.54 99.34 99.13 
3 AW 4,129.51 100 99.87 99.70 99.52 99.32 99.12 
6 AW 8,213.58 100 99.82 99.63 99.44 99.24 99.02 
 
 
Panel C: Post-interruption wage penalty; Baseline earnings profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 383.72 100 98.78 98.78 98.78 98.78 98.78 
0.75 AW 548.75 100 90.17 81.30 73.46 69.39 69.07 
AW 731.03 100 90.02 81.03 72.95 65.67 59.19 
1.5 AW 1,094.26 100 90.02 81.04 72.97 65.67 59.12 
2 AW 1,457.28 100 90.01 81.02 72.93 65.66 59.13 
3 AW 2,177.90 100 90.04 81.06 73.00 65.69 59.13 
6 AW 4,326.35 100 89.97 80.98 72.91 65.60 59.04 
 
 
Panel D: Post-interruption wage penalty; Ascending wage profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 724.45 100 90.02 80.99 72.84 65.51 58.94 
0.75 AW 1,040.82 100 90.06 81.11 73.02 65.74 59.25 
AW 1,386.02 100 90.02 81.04 72.96 65.67 59.10 
1.5 AW 2,075.25 100 90.05 81.05 72.95 65.66 59.10 
2 AW 2,760.79 100 90.05 81.09 73.03 65.74 59.17 
3 AW 4,129.51 100 90.06 81.06 72.96 65.68 59.13 
6 AW 8,213.58 100 89.98 80.97 72.87 65.60 59.05 
 
 
Source: Author's calculations; Notes: Duration of unemployment spells measured in years; The baseline denotes normalisation to full career. 
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The reduced impact of unemployment spells occurring 
early in the contribution career is explained by both the 
DB pension formula and the mitigating effect of pension 
credits. The pension formula effect stems from the fact 
that, for generations retiring up to December 2016, a 
more generous transitional rule is to be applied by 
which pensions are calculated by a weighted average 
(pro rata) of the previous method (average earnings for 
the best 10 out of the last 15 years contribution years) 
and the current lifetime (40-year) reference earnings 
method. The mitigating effect of pension credits (limited 
to periods of benefit recipiency and capped by a 
relatively low amount - 2.5 IAS) results from the fact that 
time spent in unemployment is credited as insured 
period and considered as equivalent to paid 
employment. The effect of early contribution years on 
initial pension benefits is also highly dependent on the 
rules used for valorisation of past wages when 
averaging.  
As expected, our simulation results show that the 
assumption of no post-interruption penalty for wages is 
more relevant for ascending wage profiles compared to 
the baseline benchmark career. The impact of single 
unemployment spells on pension entitlements becomes 
much more significant when we assume that job 
displacement is followed by a lower trajectory for future 
earnings after re-engagement, and the earnings scarring 
of unemployment is more significant for longer 
unemployment periods. The gross pension of a worker 
earning the baseline AW throughout life and interrupting 
his career for one to five years would in this case drop 
by an amount ranging between 9.98% and 40.81% 
relative to a worker who has not interrupted his career 
(Table 2, Panel C). For AW workers with an ascending 
wage profile the gap is almost indistinguishable and 
ranges between 9.98% and 40.90% for one to five-year 
unemployment breaks, respectively (Table 2, Panel D). 
Not surprisingly, for baseline MW earners 
unemployment spells have little marginal effect on gross 
pension entitlements when we assume that job 
displacement is followed by a lower trajectory for future 
earnings. This is both a result of minimum wage 
legislation preventing wages to fall below a certain 
threshold, of the way unemployment insurance benefits 
are computed in Portugal, namely the existence of a 
lower bound that approximates the minimum wage, and 
of the existence of minimum pension levels for 
contributory pensions (€379.04 for workers with at least 
31 contribution years). 
Moving now to the impact of single unemployment 
spells of different duration taking place at the middle of 
the contribution career (between ages 40 and 45), 
drops in old-age pensions continue not to be very 
significant when unemployed workers are able to re-
enter the job market few years later at the then 
corresponding average wage, i.e., when earnings 
scarring effects are insignificant. 
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Table 3. Initial gross pension benefits and relative gross pension entitlements for single unemployment spells occurring at the 
middle of the contribution career 
 
Panel A: No post-interruption wage penalty; Baseline earnings profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 383.72 100 99.84 99.57 99.23 98.84 98.78 
0.75 AW 548.75 100 99.82 99.53 99.19 98.79 98.36 
AW 731.03 100 99.76 99.43 99.05 98.64 98.20 
1.5 AW 1,094.26 100 99.76 99.43 99.06 98.65 98.21 
2 AW 1,457.28 100 99.76 99.40 99.01 98.58 98.14 
3 AW 2,177.90 100 99.73 99.36 98.98 98.56 98.13 
6 AW 4,326.35 100 99.66 99.27 98.87 98.45 98.03 
 
 
Panel B: No post-interruption wage penalty; Ascending wage profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 724.45 100 99.86 99.64 99.36 99.04 98.69 
0.75 AW 1,040.82 100 99.82 99.57 99.28 98.95 98.59 
AW 1,386.02 100 99.82 99.57 99.28 98.95 98.59 
1.5 AW 2,075.25 100 99.82 99.56 99.26 98.94 98.58 
2 AW 2,760.79 100 99.80 99.53 99.22 98.89 98.54 
3 AW 4,129.51 100 99.77 99.48 99.18 98.85 98.49 
6 AW 8,213.58 100 99.73 99.42 99.10 98.76 98.41 
 
 
Panel C: Post-interruption wage penalty; Baseline earnings profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 383.72 100 99.84 99.57 99.23 98.84 98.78 
0.75 AW 548.75 100 90.65 82.21 74.60 70.68 70.36 
AW 731.03 100 90.58 82.09 74.45 67.58 61.41 
1.5 AW 1,094.26 100 90.59 82.10 74.47 67.60 61.44 
2 AW 1,457.28 100 90.58 82.05 74.39 67.50 61.32 
3 AW 2,177.90 100 90.57 82.04 74.39 67.51 61.33 
6 AW 4,326.35 100 90.49 81.92 74.24 67.35 61.15 
 
 
Panel D: Post-interruption wage penalty; Ascending wage profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 724.45 100 90.47 81.87 74.12 67.15 60.91 
0.75 AW 1,040.82 100 90.36 81.64 73.79 66.73 60.38 
AW 1,386.02 100 90.35 81.64 73.81 66.76 60.42 
1.5 AW 2,075.25 100 90.39 81.64 73.77 66.70 60.34 
2 AW 2,760.79 100 90.34 81.62 73.77 66.72 60.36 
3 AW 4,129.51 100 90.33 81.56 73.68 66.59 60.23 
6 AW 8,213.58 100 90.24 81.45 73.56 66.47 60.10 
 
 
Source: Author's calculations; Notes: Duration of unemployment spells measured in years; The baseline denotes normalisation to full career. 
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The gross pension of a worker who earns the baseline 
AW and interrupts his career for one to five years would 
now drop by an amount ranging between 0.24% and 
1.80% relative to a full-career worker (Table 3, Panel A), 
a drop which is slightly higher when compared to 
equivalent unemployment periods occurring early in the 
contribution career (Table 2, Panel A). 
For AW workers with an ascending wage profile, the gap 
relative to full-career workers continues to be lower 
when compared to baseline earnings profiles but now 
with by a smaller amount when compared to that 
computed for early in life unemployment spells. 
Unemployment breaks reduce gross pensions by an 
amount ranging between 0.18% and 1.41% for one to 
five-year unemployment periods (Table 3, Panel B). The 
effect of unemployment breaks on pension entitlements 
continues to be higher for medium to high-income 
earners and lower for low (minimum wage) earners, and 
is positively correlated with the duration of 
unemployment periods. 
The impact of unemployment spells occurring at the 
middle of the contribution career increases dramatically 
when earnings scarring effects become relevant, 
particularly for longer unemployment breaks (Table 3, 
Panel C and D). The gross pension of a worker earning 
the baseline AW throughout life and interrupting his 
career for one to five years would in this case drop by 
an amount ranging between 9.42% and 38.59% 
relative to a worker who has not interrupted his career 
(Table 3, Panel C), or by an amount ranging between 
9.65% and 39.58% for AW workers with an ascending 
wage profile (Table 3, Panel D). Scarring effects have a 
slightly lower impact on gross pensions when compared 
to unemployment spells taking place early in the 
contribution career because the lower trajectory for 
future earnings after re-engagement will affect a smaller 
number of contribution years at the time of computing 
initial pension benefits. 
Moving finally to the impact of single unemployment 
spells of different duration taking place late in the 
contribution career, in pre-retirement ages (between 
ages 62 and 66), drops in old-age pensions become 
comparatively higher than those estimated for breaks 
occurring early or at the middle of the contribution 
career, particularly for those cases where unemployed 
workers can re-enter the job market few years later at 
the then corresponding average wage. For instance, the 
gross pension of a worker who earns the baseline AW 
and interrupts his career for one to five years would in 
this case drop by an amount ranging between 0.94% 
and 4.95% relative to a full-career worker (Table 4, 
Panel A), or by an amount ranging between 1.91% and 
12.97% for AW workers with an ascending wage profile 
(Table 4, Panel B). For one-year unemployment breaks 
this pension drop is more than four (fifteen) times higher 
than that of an equivalent break taking place at the 
beginning of the contribution career for a baseline 
(ascending) earnings profile. 
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Table 4. Initial gross pension benefits and relative gross pension entitlements for single unemployment spells occurring at the 
end of the contribution career 
 
Panel A: No post-interruption wage penalty; Baseline earnings profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 383.72 100 98.78 98.78 98.78 98.78 98.78 
0.75 AW 548.75 100 99.07 98.19 97.36 96.30 95.09 
AW 731.03 100 99.06 98.17 97.32 96.27 95.05 
1.5 AW 1,094.26 100 99.06 98.13 97.26 96.18 94.96 
2 AW 1,457.28 100 99.05 98.11 97.24 96.17 94.94 
3 AW 2,177.90 100 98.97 98.00 97.11 96.03 94.81 
6 AW 4,326.35 100 98.89 97.89 96.99 95.90 94.68 
 
 
Panel B: No post-interruption wage penalty; Ascending wage profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 724.45 100 97.59 94.89 92.12 88.98 85.44 
0.75 AW 1,040.82 100 98.09 95.88 93.43 90.46 87.03 
AW 1,386.02 100 98.09 95.87 93.42 90.46 87.03 
1.5 AW 2,075.25 100 98.00 95.75 93.27 90.29 86.83 
2 AW 2,760.79 100 97.95 95.67 93.17 90.20 86.75 
3 AW 4,129.51 100 97.92 95.63 93.12 90.12 86.66 
6 AW 8,213.58 100 97.86 95.54 93.01 90.01 86.55 
 
 
Panel C: Post-interruption wage penalty; Baseline earnings profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 383.72 100 98.78 98.78 98.78 98.78 98.78 
0.75 AW 548.75 100 96.60 96.14 95.74 95.42 95.09 
AW 731.03 100 96.59 96.11 95.70 95.35 95.05 
1.5 AW 1,094.26 100 96.59 96.08 95.64 95.27 94.96 
2 AW 1,457.28 100 96.58 96.06 95.62 95.25 94.94 
3 AW 2,177.90 100 96.50 95.95 95.50 95.12 94.81 
6 AW 4,326.35 100 96.41 95.84 95.38 95.00 94.68 
 
 
Panel D: Post-interruption wage penalty; Ascending wage profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of Unemployment 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 724.45 100 93.70 89.34 86.80 85.80 85.44 
0.75 AW 1,040.82 100 94.28 90.42 88.18 87.40 87.03 
AW 1,386.02 100 94.27 90.40 88.17 87.39 87.03 
1.5 AW 2,075.25 100 94.19 90.29 88.02 87.21 86.83 
2 AW 2,760.79 100 94.13 90.19 87.92 87.13 86.75 
3 AW 4,129.51 100 94.09 90.15 87.85 87.04 86.66 
6 AW 8,213.58 100 94.01 90.03 87.73 86.93 86.55 
 
 
Source: Author's calculations; Notes: Duration of unemployment spells measured in years; The baseline denotes normalisation to full career. 
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The main explanation for this effect lies in the old-age 
pension benefit formula which for cohorts retiring until 
the end of 2016 assigns considerable more weight to 
the best 10 out of the last 15 contribution years, i.e., 
those affected by unemployment breaks. In upward 
sloping continuous earnings profiles the last contribution 
years will be the ones with higher salaries. In the event 
of a late unemployment spell, those years are likely to 
be excluded in the computation of initial pension 
benefits once they are not likely to be part of the 10 
best out of the last 15 contribution years, despite the 
mitigating effect of pension credit mechanisms that 
consider unemployment benefits as labour income. 
The importance of scarring effects on gross pension 
entitlements is comparatively less severe for 
unemployment spells occurring late in the contribution 
career since the number of earning and contribution 
years affected (and the subsequent compounding effect) 
is, in this case, marginal and the current Portuguese old-
age pension formula is likely to exclude them at the time 
of calculating the initial pension. The gross pension of a 
worker earning the baseline AW and interrupting his 
career for one to five years would in this case drop by 
an amount ranging between 3.41% and 4.95% relative 
to full-career worker (Table 4, Panel C), or by an amount 
ranging between 5.73% and 12.97% for AW workers 
with an ascending wage profile (Table 4, Panel D). 
Scarring effects have a much lower impact on gross 
pensions when compared to unemployment spells 
taking place early or at the middle of the contribution 
career as can be seen by comparing Panels C and D in 
Table 4 with their counterparts in Tables 2 and 3. The 
effect of unemployment breaks on pension entitlements 
continues to be higher for medium to high-income 
earners and lower for minimum wage earners, and the 
higher the duration of unemployment periods. For low 
earners, minimum pension clauses significantly reduce 
the effect of unemployment breaks on gross pension 
benefits.  
In Table 5 we represent the impact of multiple 
unemployment spells occurring «simultaneously» at the 
beginning, middle and end of the contribution career on 
gross pension entitlements for representative workers 
with alternative earnings levels and profiles. In every 
Panel, columns 4 to 8 now represent the relative gross 
pension for a worker whose contribution career was 
interrupted for a period of one to five years three times 
during his working life. This means the duration of 
unemployment spells ranges now between a minimum 
of three years (column 4) and a maximum of fifteen 
years (column 8). For instance, column 4 refers to 
relative gross pension entitlements of workers who were 
unemployed for one year three times during the career: 
one at the beginning, another one at the middle and the 
last one just before retiring. 
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Table 5. Initial gross pension benefits and relative gross pension entitlements for multiple unemployment spells of different 
duration 
 
Panel A: No post-interruption wage penalty; Baseline earnings profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of each one of unemployment spells 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 383.72 100 98.78 98.78 98.78 98.78 98.78 
0.75 AW 548.75 100 98.72 97.31 95.84 94.05 92.03 
AW 731.03 100 98.60 97.11 95.58 93.76 91.73 
1.5 AW 1,094.26 100 98.59 97.05 95.50 93.67 91.64 
2 AW 1,457.28 100 98.58 97.01 95.43 93.58 91.55 
3 AW 2,177.90 100 98.46 96.83 95.23 93.39 91.35 
6 AW 4,326.35 100 98.24 96.52 94.89 93.04 90.99 
 
 
Panel B: No post-interruption wage penalty; Ascending wage profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of each one of unemployment spells 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 724.45 100 97.31 94.17 90.85 87.09 82.93 
0.75 AW 1,040.82 100 97.81 95.21 92.28 88.77 84.75 
AW 1,386.02 100 97.78 95.16 92.23 88.74 84.73 
1.5 AW 2,075.25 100 97.70 95.01 92.02 88.49 84.45 
2 AW 2,760.79 100 97.62 94.91 91.94 88.43 84.41 
3 AW 4,129.51 100 97.55 94.78 91.76 88.21 84.17 
6 AW 8,213.58 100 97.40 94.59 91.55 88.01 83.99 
 
 
Panel C: Post-interruption wage penalty; Baseline earnings profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of each one of unemployment spells 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 383.72 100 98.78 98.78 98.78 79.02 79.02 
0.75 AW 548.75 100 79.07 69.07 69.07 64.98 63.47 
AW 731.03 100 78.79 64.09 53.08 49.55 48.16 
1.5 AW 1,094.26 100 78.79 63.98 52.02 42.46 34.68 
2 AW 1,457.28 100 78.76 63.93 52.03 42.36 34.59 
3 AW 2,177.90 100 78.77 63.96 51.94 42.27 34.49 
6 AW 4,326.35 100 78.53 63.61 51.62 42.00 34.26 
 
 
Panel D: Post-interruption wage penalty; Ascending wage profile 
Earnings 
profiles  
Baseline Duration of each one of unemployment spells 
Pension EUR Index 1 2 3 4 5 
MW 724.45 100 76.36 59.48 52.32 41.86 41.86 
0.75 AW 1,040.82 100 76.72 59.98 47.71 38.94 33.56 
AW 1,386.02 100 76.69 59.87 47.56 38.41 31.24 
1.5 AW 2,075.25 100 76.66 59.83 47.51 38.38 31.16 
2 AW 2,760.79 100 76.64 59.82 47.52 38.36 31.15 
3 AW 4,129.51 100 76.52 59.65 47.37 38.26 31.07 
6 AW 8,213.58 100 76.35 59.44 47.14 38.00 30.81 
 
 
Source: Author's calculations; Notes: Duration of each one of the three unemployment spells measured in years; The baseline denotes normalisation to 
full career. 
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As expected, the impact of multiple unemployment 
breaks on old-age pensions is more significant than its 
single-break counterparts, especially for baseline 
earnings profiles, even when unemployed workers are 
able to re-enter the job market few years later at the 
then corresponding average wage. The gross pension of 
a worker who earns the baseline AW and interrupts his 
career for three to fifteen years would now drop by an 
amount ranging between 1.40% and 8.27% relative to 
a full-career worker (Table 5, Panel A), or by an amount 
ranging between 2.22% and 15.27% for AW workers 
with an ascending wage profile (Table 5, Panel B). 
The initial pension of low earners is, in this case, less 
protected by minimum wage clauses in the event of 
longer total unemployment periods (12 and 15 years). 
This is because according to the Portuguese pension 
system rules the minimum contributory pension for 
contribution periods between 21 and 31 years is only 
303.23 EUR, a significant drop from the 379.04 for 
contribution periods exceeding 31 years. As a result, the 
relative pension of workers earning the MW and facing 
several unemployment spells of 4 or 5 years every time 
will be 20.98% lower than their full-career counterparts. 
The effect of unemployment breaks on pension 
entitlements continues to be higher for medium to high-
income earners and lower for low (minimum wage) 
earners and the higher the duration of unemployment 
periods. 
The impact of unemployment breaks on gross pensions 
increases substantially when scarring effects are taken 
into consideration, particularly for baseline medium and 
high earners. The gross pension of a worker earning the 
baseline AW throughout life and interrupting his career 
for three to fifteen years would in this case drop by an 
amount ranging between 21.21% and 51.84% relative 
to a worker who has not interrupted his career (Table 5, 
Panel C), or by an amount ranging between 23.31% 
and 68.76% for AW workers with an ascending wage 
profile (Table 5, Panel D). 
The effect of unemployment breaks on relative gross 
pensions is generally less severe for low income earners. 
This is because implicit redistributive mechanisms such 
as those beyond pension benefit calculation rules, 
minimum pensions and, in some cases, resource-tested 
schemes play a key role in guaranteeing adequate 
pensions. In the typical cases under consideration, 
redistribution essentially plays a role for low earnings 
profiles. For medium and high labour income earners, 
the empirical evidence of redistributive mechanisms in 
the pension calculation rules is less significant when we 
compare interrupted career and full-career profiles. 
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4. An illustrative simulation for Spain 
The Spanish Social Security pensions scheme offers 
comprehensive retirement and derived contingencies 
benefits to virtually all private sector workers (salaried 
and self-employed workers) and public officials not 
covered by the General Government Public Servants 
scheme (Bravo and Herce, 2014).  
Receiving a “full” old-age pension requires long 
contribution careers (around 35 years) but only the last 
20 years pensionable wages, prior to retirement day, 
are taken for the computation of pension rights.8 This 
implies that unemployment or inactivity periods 
occurred before the computation period starts biding 
have no effect on pensionable wages actually entering 
the pension formula even if they do have an effect in 
the length of the contributions career that also 
determine the retirement benefits amount (see Section 
4.1 below for an explanation of the Spanish pension 
formula). 
The Spanish public pension system, however, has clear 
provisions for granting contribution credits to workers 
that have suffered employment breaks during the above 
mentioned computation period. In the first lieu, if these 
employment breaks happen because of unemployment, 
and during these unemployment spells workers are 
effectively under unemployment insurance or assistance 
schemes, their contributions are taken in charge by the 
unemployment programme.9 Secondly, when these 
breaks are due to general inactivity or out of benefits 
unemployment, workers are credited with imputed 
contributions amounting to the minimum contribution 
wage for the closest (to retirement) 48 months and half 
that minimum contribution wage for the remaining.10 
Actually, this amounts to a “gift” that the Social Security 
system makes to salaried workers that have temporarily 
interrupted their labour careers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
8 As of 2017 this “computation period” is set at 20 years and is gradually 
increasing one year every year until 2022 when it will stay at 25 years. Debate 
is emerging in Spain about bringing this period up to the whole contributions 
career whatever its length. 
9 Unemployment insurance benefits can be received for up to 24 months. Once 
these benefits terminated, and if the worker has dependent persons in his/her 
household, and passes an earnings test, an unemployment subsidy may be 
granted for up to another 30 months. 
10 Self-employed workers however cannot use this rule to fill employment 
breaks into their contribution records if out of activity. For them, contribution 
wages for these periods are set to cero in the pension formula. 
4.1 Assumptions and basic 
data 
In what follows the cases of typical workers that have 
suffered employment breaks are simulated. These cases 
are built upon the following assumptions: 
o Typical workers are affiliated to the “Régimen 
General” of the Social Security scheme. These are 
salaried workers both in the private and public 
sectors and are the large majority of those in 
employment in Spain. 
o Typical workers’ cases include average wage (AW), 
minimum wage (MW), and 0.5, 2x and 4x average 
wage earners. 
o These workers (in the baseline) have a full 
contribution career of 35 years started in 1997 and 
retire at 65 the first of January 2016 (or 31st 
December 2015, for the sake or applicable law). 
o In the “employment-breaks” scenarios, their 
contribution careers are impacted by unemployment 
spells of 2 and 5 years’ duration. They all may have 
1 unemployment spell at early career time, 1 
unemployment spell later, or both. Earlier or later 
meaning before or after the current “computation 
period” mark of 19 years before retirement.11 
o All retirement pensions computations are based on 
the current pension formula that works in the 
following manner in the baseline case (no 
employment-breaks): 
(i) Pensionable wages (limited by a floor and a roof) 
of the last 19 years prior to retirement (i.e. from 
1997 to 2015) enter the formula. These 
pensionable wages coincide with actual wages 
that are above the minimum pensionable wage or 
below the maximum pensionable wage (see 
Figure 4 below). 
(ii) Pensionable wages for the last two years are 
taken at nominal value, whereas pensionable 
wages for the previous years are brought to 
present value (as of 2015) using the official (CPI) 
inflation rate. 
(iii) The average present value pensionable wage (the 
“Base Reguladora”, in Spanish) is then computed. 
 
                                                                
11 20 years as of 2017, and increasing one year every year to reach 25 years in 
2022. 
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(iv) Full retirement pension is computed as 100% of 
the Base Reguladora as no early retirement or 
shorter than full contributions careers, nor 
delayed retirement are considered. Had these 
situations be taken, they would imply actuarial 
penalties per quarter in which retirement had 
been advanced and/or full contribution career 
shortened and premiums would have accrued to 
retirees who delayed their retirement beyond the 
reference retirement age.  
(v) Initial retirement pensions on yearly bases are 
computed considering legal provisions 
concerning minimum and maximum limits for the 
scheme’s standard case as of 2015 (see Figure 5 
below). 
o Employment-breaks are treated following the current 
law so that, when they happen, workers receive 
contribution credits based on the minimum 
contribution wage if breaks happen during the 
closest (to retirement) 48 months and half the 
contribution wage otherwise. When breaks happen 
before the 19 (before retirement) years mark for the 
pension “computation period”, that is, at earlier times 
in the contribution career, they have no impact on 
initial pensions at all. For tis breaks integration to be 
possible they must happen “in-between” ordinary 
contributions spans and within the computation 
period prior to retirement. 
In Figure 4 below, the evolution of the wage categories 
considered as well as of contribution wages (CW) is 
pictured. It’s immediately identifiable that minimum 
contribution wage is very close to minimum wage 
whereas maximum contribution wages are sensibly 
lower than 2x average wage by 18,8% (in 2015), 
notwithstanding the fact that contribution wages have 
been growing faster than actual wages in recent years. 
Figure 4. Wages and Contribution Wages in Spain 1997 - 
2015  (in EUR 103) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Spanish Social Security data; 
Legend. MW: minimum wage; Min/Max CW: minimum/maximum 
contribution wage; AW: average wage. 
 
 
Figure 5, below, presents, as of 2015, the minimum 
wage, average wage (and multiples), contribution wage 
and initial retirement pension (minimum and maximum 
limits for both) applicable for this illustrative exercise. 
Figure 5. Wages and Contribution Wages in Spain 2015 (in 
EUR 103) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Spanish Social Security data; 
Legend. MW: minimum wage; AW: average wage; Min/Max CW: 
minimum/maximum contribution wage; Min/Max Pens.: 
minimum/maximum initial retirement pension. 
 
 
It’s also immediately clear that minimum wage, 
minimum contribution wage and initial retirement 
pensions are very close, not being this the case between 
2x average wage and maximum contribution wage. It’s 
however interesting to note that minimum pension is 
only 2,2% lower than minimum contribution wage (and 
minimum wage) whereas maximum pension is 17,1% 
lower than maximum contribution wage. Very clearly, 
this shows the redistributive part of the Spanish Social 
Security pensions system.  
Finally, Figure 6 presents wage profiles for the types of 
workers and employment-breaks considered in this 
exercise. For the sake of simplicity only earnings profiles 
with both employment breaks are shown. In fact, both 
the early and the late career breaks can be singled out 
easily from the graphs. It is assumed that these 
contribution gaps are caused by unemployment if the 
worker is not entitled to receive unemployment 
insurance or assistance benefits. Were this the case, 
they would receive benefits that would replace lost 
wages at around 70% or more and, at the same time, 
the unemployment programme would pay social 
security contributions on their behalf throughout all the 
unemployment spell provided the unemployment 
duration is shorter than two years (in the general case, 
as there are exceptions to this rule) so that no severe 
impact on their future pensions would result. 
          
           
 
 
24 
Figure 6 
A. Earnings profile of typical workers that experience one 
early and one latter 2 years’ employment-break (being 
this out of benefits unemployment) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Spanish Statistical 
Office 
Legend: MW, minimum wage; AW, average wage. 
 
 
B. Earnings profile of typical workers that experience one 
early and one latter 5 years’ employment-break (being 
this out of benefits unemployment) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Spanish Statistical 
Office 
Legend: MW, minimum wage; AW, average wage. 
 
Earnings profiles shown in Figure 6 convey the message 
that in the absence of a contribution credit rule, that 
somehow compensates for lack of contributions during 
employment breaks, future initial retirement pensions 
could suffer significant reductions with respect to those 
of workers that have completed their contribution 
careers without interruption. 
 
 
4.2 Results and discussion 
If a Spanish worker experiences employment breaks 
within his or her contributions career but out of the 
“computation period” used to form the Base Reguladora, 
or average present value pensionable wage, there is no 
way to fill this up. If, however, one or more employment 
breaks occur within this period, there is a contribution 
credit rule that partially fills the break period with 
imputed contributions that amount to the minimum 
pensionable wage for the first 48 month and half this 
amount for the rest. As we have seen before, minimum 
pensionable wage has been very close to minimum 
wage, but has evolved far below earnings at even 
average wage. So, it should be expected that, for a 
large majority of workers, employment breaks may have 
significant impact on their future initial retirement 
pensions. 
Table 6 below exhibits the main results obtained for the 
simulations explained in the previous section. Panel A 
presents the amount in euros per year for minimum 
wage, average wage and 2x average wage earners and 
for workers that have not experienced breaks (full 
career) or have experienced one or two breaks of 2 or 5 
years’ duration. Panel B, while keeping the same 
structure of the data, presents initial pension for all 
categories of workers that experience breaks relative to 
the corresponding wage category of worker that has not 
experienced labour-breaks during his or her contribution 
career. 
Table 6 
A. Initial retirement pension (euros) - 2016 
 
 
B. Initial retirement pension relative to no breaks case - 
2016 
 
Source: author’s computations 
 
First thing to be noted is that the existence of 
contribution credits arrangements significantly protects 
workers from losing pension entitlements even if 
average wage earners that experience longer duration 
breaks may suffer disproportionately. But, for workers 
earning well above or below average wages, the impact 
of labour breaks on initial future pensions is greatly 
reduced because of the role played by lower and upper 
retirement pension limits.  
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5. Conclusions 
Ample literature shows that workers may experience 
several unemployment spells of varying durations 
through their working lifecycles. This, of course, has 
strong implications for their income during those periods 
out of work. Most countries have unemployment 
protection that replaces to a certain extent lost labour 
income for average duration spells. Less known, even if 
a series of reference papers have been written providing 
the basis for this analysis, are the consequences of 
employment-breaks (due to unemployment or inactivity) 
for the acquisition of pension rights and, consequently, 
for future initial pensions. Anecdotal evidence is also 
overwhelming that employment-breaks may be both 
seriously detrimental or very limited for workers’ future 
pension rights depending on the pension scheme 
and/or country where workers generate their retirement 
pensions, as some countries lack or have Social Security 
rules for filling up contribution gaps due to employment-
breaks if or while workers are protected by 
unemployment insurance. Also, given accrual periods 
and pension formulas, early in life unemployment spells 
may not end up having consequences for future 
pensions. 
This paper assessed the impact of shorter, more 
fragmented careers on the initial pension benefits from 
public mandatory schemes in Portugal and Spain, taking 
into account the timing and duration of non-
employment spells, the existence of pension credit 
mechanisms to compensate the contribution gap, 
alternative lifecycle labour earnings profiles, the 
significance of restoration effects, several layers of 
earnings profiles and other redistributive mechanisms in 
pension systems. We provide detailed simulations results 
for Portugal and more illustrative benchmark cases for 
Spain. 
The empirical results show that the impact of single 
unemployment spells of different duration occurring 
early in the contribution career on the gross pension 
entitlements of low-, average-, and high-earning workers 
is small if unemployed workers are able to find a new 
job maintaining their relative pay. The importance of no 
post-interruption penalty for wages is more relevant for 
ascending wage profiles compared to the baseline 
benchmark career. The impact of single unemployment 
spells on pension entitlements is more significant when 
job displacement is followed by a lower trajectory for 
future earnings after re-engagement, and the higher the 
longer the duration of unemployment periods. Not 
surprisingly, for baseline minimum wage earners career-
breaks have little marginal effect on gross pension 
entitlements irrespectively of the magnitude of scarring 
effects. This is because of both minimum wage 
legislation, pension credit mechanisms and the way 
unemployment insurance benefits are computed. 
The impact of single unemployment spells of different 
duration taking place at the middle of the contribution 
career continue not to be very significant when 
unemployed workers are able to rejoin the labour 
market with minor wage penalties, but increase 
substantially when earnings scarring effects become 
relevant, particularly for longer unemployment breaks. 
Single unemployment spells of different duration taking 
place in pre-retirement ages have a higher impact on 
pension benefits when compared to those occurring 
early or at the middle of the contribution career. The 
importance of scarring effects on gross pension 
entitlements is comparatively less severe for 
unemployment spells occurring late in the contribution 
career due to the number of earning and contribution 
years affected and DB pension formulas. 
The impact of multiple contribution gaps on old-age 
pensions is more significant than their single-break 
counterparts, especially for baseline earnings profiles, 
even when unemployed workers are able to re-enter the 
job market few years later at the then corresponding 
average wage. The initial pension of low earners can, in 
this case, be less protected by minimum wage clauses 
in the event of longer total unemployment periods if 
minimum pensions are directly linked to contributory 
periods. The impact of multiple unemployment-breaks 
on pensions increases substantially when scarring effects 
are taken into consideration. The existence of 
contribution credits arrangements significantly protects 
workers from losing pension entitlements even if 
average wage earners that experience longer duration 
breaks may suffer disproportionately. 
Given the differences and similarities of Social Security 
arrangements in both countries, and the span of the 
assumptions made to represent typical cases, we can 
show that indeed some workers may suffer 
disproportionately from previous employment-breaks 
while others would hardly have any impact. This 
depending on when breaks occurred, their duration, 
which earnings bracket the worker was in and whether 
workers were protected by imputed contributions rules 
during unemployment spells and/or their pensions were 
affected by binding minimum and maximum limits. 
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Appendix: Old age, unemployment and 
parenthood schemes in Portugal 
Old-age Pension Benefit 
calculation in Portugal 
The calculation of pension benefits (P) in the Portuguese 
earnings related public pension schemes is based on the 
following general defined benefit formula: 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × 𝐴𝐴 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × (1 ± 𝜋𝜋) (1) 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 denotes the Reference Earnings, 𝐴𝐴 the 
Accrual Rate, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 the (demographic) Sustainability Factor 
and 𝜋𝜋 represents a bonus (penalty) for late (early) 
retirement. 
The reference earnings are calculated by averaging 
monthly earnings for all years of coverage up to 40 
years12, adjusted according to the consumer price index 
(CPI) without considering the housing prices13. The 
accrual rate is 2% of the earnings base for each year of 
contributions for 20 or fewer years’ contributions, with a 
lower limit of 30%. For beneficiaries with 21 or more 
years of contributions, the accrual rate ranges between 
2% and 2.3% depending on individual earnings relative 
to the value of the IAS (Indexante dos Apoios Sociais – 
Social Support Index; EUR 419.22 in 2015), as follows 
Reference 
Earnings/IAS 
≤1.1 ]1.1,2.0] ]2.0,4.0] ]4.0,8.0] >8.0 
Accrual rate 
(%) 
2.3 2.25 2.2 2.1 2.0 
 
                                                                
12 Whenever the number of calendar years with earnings registration is higher than 
40, only the best 40 annual earnings years will be considered in the calculation of 
the reference earnings. 
13 In calculating lifetime reference earnings, the annual earnings registered after 1 
January 2002 are adjusted by applying an index resulting from the weighting of 
75% of the CPI, and 25% of the average evolution of the earnings which underlie 
the contributions stated to the social security, whenever this evolution is higher 
than the CPI. The annual adjustment index cannot, however, be higher than the 
CPI, plus 0.5%. 
For a given value of 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, the corresponding pension formula is 
then: 
 
RE/IAS Pension Formula 
≤1.1 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 × 2,3% × 𝑁𝑁 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × (1 ± 𝜋𝜋) 
]1.1,2.0] 𝑃𝑃 = (1,1𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,3% × 𝑁𝑁) + [(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 1,1𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆) × 2,25% × 𝑁𝑁] × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆× (1 ± 𝜋𝜋) 
]2.0,4.0] 𝑃𝑃 = (1,1 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,3% × 𝑁𝑁) + (0,9 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,25% × 𝑁𝑁) +         [(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 2𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆) × 2,2% × 𝑁𝑁] × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × (1 ± 𝜋𝜋) 
]4.0,8.0] 𝑃𝑃 = (1,1𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,3% × 𝑁𝑁) + (0,9𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,25% × 𝑁𝑁)+ (2𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,2% × 𝑁𝑁)     +         [(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 4𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆) × 2,1% × 𝑁𝑁] × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × (1 ± 𝜋𝜋) 
>8.0 𝑃𝑃 = (1,1𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,3% × 𝑁𝑁) + (0,9𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,25% × 𝑁𝑁)+ (2𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,2% × 𝑁𝑁)     +          (4𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆 × 2,1% × 𝑁𝑁) + [(𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 8𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆) × 2% × 𝑁𝑁] × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × (1 ± 𝜋𝜋) 
Note: N = number of contributions years 
 
The pensionable earnings measure was the best 10 of 
the final 15 years. This measure is being extended and 
will be lifetime average earnings from 2017. For a 
transitional period, pensions are calculated by a 
weighted average (pro rata) of the previous method (2% 
of average annual earnings for the best 10 calendar 
years out of the last 15 years multiplied by the total 
number of qualifying calendar years) and the current 
lifetime reference earnings method. This means for 
individuals retiring up to this date the former more 
generous pension formula will have a greater weight on 
the calculation of initial pension benefits. 
Those already paying contributions by 31 December 
2001 and who meet the eligibility conditions for old-age 
pension at that date will have their pension calculated on 
the basis of the most favourable of three possible 
formulas: 
1. applying the previous rules (2% accrual for each year 
of contributions and earnings being those of the best 
ten years of the final 15 years); 
2. applying the new rules described above to the entire 
contributory career; 
3. pro rata application of both rules according to the 
contributory career. 
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Those already paying contributions by 31 December 
2001, but who have not met the eligibility conditions for 
old-age pension at that date, will have their pension 
calculated from the most favourable of the three 
formulas, if they retire between 2002 and 2016; or by 
the most favourable of formulas (2) and (3), if they retire 
after 31 December 2016. People who joined the system 
after 2002 will be fully covered by the new rules. 
The sustainability factor is a demographic factor 
designed to adjust pension benefits to longevity 
changes. This factor is calculated on an annual basis by 
dividing overall population life expectancy at age 65 in 
2000 (previously 2006) and the one recorded in the 
year before the pension claim, i.e.,  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒65,2000𝑒𝑒65,𝑡𝑡−1  (2) 
The sustainability factor is now taken into account in the 
benefit formula only in the case of early retirement or 
(except for some particular cases) when disability 
pensions are converted into old-age pensions (currently 
at age 65). 
The statutory retirement age was 66 years in 2014 and 
2015 and has increase to 66 years and two months in 
2016. This development follows the automatic process 
of adjusting the normal age of retirement by two-thirds 
of gains in life expectancy from age 65 measured as the 
average of the previous two years. The statutory 
retirement age can be reduced by four months for each 
year of contributions exceeding 40 years when the 
beneficiary turns 65 years of old.  
Early pensions are penalized by the sustainability factor 
plus an additional penalty of 0.5% for each month in 
anticipation of the statutory retirement age. Deferred 
pensions are increased for each additional calendar 
month of contributions from the statutory retirement 
age to age 70 by a monthly bonus rate, given that the 
insured person claims the old-age pension when he/she 
is older than the statutory retirement age and has at 
least 15 calendar years with earnings registration 
relevant to the pension calculation. The monthly bonus 
rate varies according to the number of calendar years 
with earnings registration completed by the insured 
person at the time of pension claim, as follows: 
Contributory career (years) Monthly bonus rate (%) 
15 to 24 0.33 
25 to 34 0.5 
35 to 39 0.65 
≥ 40 1.00 
 
The minimum pension is either 30% of the reference 
earnings used for pension calculation or a fixed monthly 
amount according to the number of contribution years 
(as detailed in the following table), whichever is greater 
Contributory career (years) Monthly pension (EUR) 
< 15 261.95 
15 to 2 274.70 
21 to 30 303.23 
≥ 31 379.04 
The maximum pension is 92% of the reference 
earnings. 
 
Unemployment insurance and 
assistance benefits in Portugal 
In Portugal unemployment insurance benefits are 
granted only to those involuntarily unemployed that are 
not working, registered as job seeker with the job 
centre, fully capable of working, available and actively 
looking for work, are not in receipt of an invalidity or old-
age pension and reside in Portugal. The unemployment 
insurance benefit (subsídio de desemprego) corresponds 
to 65% of reference wage, reduced by 10% after 180 
days. The amount is increased by 10% in situations 
where both spouses (or both persons living in a de facto 
relationship) draw unemployment benefits and have 
dependent children, or when the unemployment-benefit 
recipient is the head of a single-parent household and 
fails to receive alimony. 
The benefit cannot be higher than 75% of the net value 
of the reference wage taken into account for the 
purposes of calculating the benefit or the equivalent of 
2.5 times the indexing reference of social support IAS 
(indexante dos apoios sociais = €419.22) and lower 
than the IAS unless the net value of the reference wage 
is below that level. In this case, the benefit amount 
corresponds to the reference wage. Unemployment 
allowance (subsídio social de desemprego) corresponds 
to 100% of the IAS for the unemployed with 
dependants and 80% for those living alone. 
Unemployment benefits are not automatically indexed 
by law. 
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The duration of unemployment insurance benefits is 
proportional to age and length of contribution as follows: 
Age in 
Years 
Contribution 
period 
Duration of 
unemployment insurance 
benefit 
< 30 
< 15 months 150 
≥ 15 months and  
< 24 months 
210 
≥ 24 months 
330 days; 30 extra days every 5 
years of registered income during 
the last 20 years preceding 
unemployment. 
[30,40[ 
< 15 months 180 
≥ 15 months and  
< 24 months 
330 
≥ 24 months 
420 days; 30 extra days every 5 
years of registered income during 
the last 20 years preceding 
unemployment. 
[40,50[ 
< 15 months 210 
≥ 15 months and  
< 24 months 
360 
≥ 24 months 
540 days; 45 extra days every 5 
years of registered income during 
the last 20 years preceding 
unemployment. 
≥ 50 
< 15 months 270 
≥ 15 months and  
< 24 months 
480 
≥ 24 months 
540 days; 60 extra days every 5 
years of registered income during 
the last 20 years preceding 
unemployment. 
 
Source: Author's preparation based on current legislation. 
 
The duration of unemployment assistance benefits is 
according to age and length of contribution period, with 
the same periods as for unemployment insurance. If 
unemployment assistance is granted after the 
exhaustion of unemployment benefit, the duration of 
payment is halved for beneficiaries aged under 40. For 
other types of beneficiaries, same periods as for 
unemployment insurance. 
 
Maternity, paternity and 
parenthood benefits in Portugal 
In Portugal, Maternity, paternity and parenthood 
benefits include initial and extended parental and 
adoption leaves, exemption from work to protect the 
health and safety of pregnant women, women who 
have just given birth and women breastfeeding and 
leave for the care of grandchildren. 
The duration of paid maternity/paternity leave is: 
Initial parental leave (licença parental inicial): 120 or 
150 consecutive days of leave, according to the parents’ 
choice, which can be divided between them after birth, 
except for the leave reserved for the mother. The 
duration of the leave is extended by 30 days in case of 
shared leave, provided each parent takes a leave of 30 
consecutive days, or two periods of 15 consecutive 
days, after the compulsory leave reserved for the 
mother; in case of multiple births, 30 days extra per 
child. 
Initial parental leave reserved for the mother 
(licença parental inicial exclusiva da mãe): Up to 30 
days of voluntary leave prior to childbirth and 6 weeks 
of compulsory leave after childbirth. These periods form 
part of the initial parental leave. 
Initial parental leave in the event of one of the 
parents being prevented from taking leave (licença 
parental inicial de um progenitor em caso de 
impossibilidade do outro): In case of death or physical 
or mental incapacity of one of the parents: until the end 
of the initial parental leave to which that parent was still 
entitled; in case of mother’s death or incapacity: a 
minimum of 30 days of initial parental leave for the 
father; in case a non-working mother dies or becomes 
incapacitated during the 120 days following the birth, 
the father has the same entitlement. 
Initial parental leave reserved for the father (licença 
parental inicial exclusiva do pai): Compulsory leave of 
10 days, of which 5 days must be taken consecutively 
immediately after birth and 5 days during the 
subsequent 30 days. After this period, voluntary leave 
of 10 days, consecutive or not, to be taken during the 
initial parental leave of the mother. 
Extended parental leave (licença parental alargada): 
to take care of children, granted either to the mother or 
to the father or to both parents alternately, in the 3 
months immediately following the expiry of the initial 
parental leave or the extended parental leave of the 
other parent. 
Adoption leave (licença por adopção): corresponds, 
mutatis mutandis, to the initial parental leave and the 
extended parental leave; in case of death or physical or 
mental incapacity of the adoptive parent: until the end 
of the leave to which that parent was still entitled, with a 
minimum of 14 days, towards the spouse (if insured) 
(extended by 30 days for each adopted minor child). 
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Leave for clinical risk during pregnancy (licença em 
situação de risco clínico durante a gravidez): for the 
time necessary to prevent the occurrence of the risk. 
Leave for termination of pregnancy (licença por 
interrupção da gravidez): for a period varying from 14 
to 30 days. 
Exemption from work to protect the health and safety of 
pregnant women, women who have just given birth and 
women breastfeeding (Dispensa da prestação de 
trabalho por parte de trabalhadora grávida, puérpera ou 
lactante, por motivo de protecção da sua segurança e 
saúde): granted if the woman works in dangerous 
health/security conditions or in the case of night-shifts. 
Leave for the care of grandchildren (faltas para 
assistência a netos): granted to the grandparents for 
up to 30 consecutive days following the birth of 
grandchildren living in the same household and whose 
father or mother are less than 16 years old; or in lieu of 
the parents in case one of them is sick: until the end of 
leave to which that parent was still entitled. 
The amount of the initial parental benefit (subsídio 
parental inicial) corresponding to a 120 days’ leave, 
initial parental benefit reserved for the father (subsídio 
parental inicial exclusivo do pai), adoption benefit 
(subsídio por adopção), benefit for clinical risk during 
pregnancy (subsídio por risco clínico durante a 
gravidez), benefit for termination of pregnancy (subsídio 
por interrupção da gravidez) is provided as a daily 
allowance of 100% of the average daily wage (Christmas 
and holiday bonuses excluded), with a minimum 
amount of 50% of the IAS.  
The initial parental benefit if a leave of 150 days was 
opted is provided as a daily allowance of 80% of the 
average daily wage. In case of opting for shared leave of 
150 or 180 days, the daily allowance corresponds to 
100% or 83% of the average daily wage, respectively. 
Extended parental benefit (subsídio parental alargado) 
provides a daily allowance of 25% of the average daily 
wage. Benefit payments in case of particular risks during 
pregnancy (subsídio por riscos específicos) provides a 
daily allowance of 65% of the average daily wage. 
Benefit for the care of grandchildren (subsídio para 
assistência a netos) is provided as a daily allowance of 
100% or 65% of the average daily wage, according to 
whether it concerns care connected with birth or care 
for a disabled or chronically ill grandchild, respectively. 
The minimum amount of these allowances is 80% of 
1/30 of the IAS, except for the extended parental benefit 
which is 40% of 1/30 of the IAS. 
 
